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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY CO.,
Petitioner/Appellant,
i

Case No. 910105

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Appellee.

]
;

BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1990) and § 78-22(3)(e)(ii) (1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the oral agreement permitting L.A. Young

Construction Company ("L.A. Young") to remove tangible personal
property in the form of slag material from Rocky Mountain Energy
Company's ("RME") leasehold estate is a taxable transaction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991).
II.

Whether Rocky Mountain Energy Company's ("RME")

sale of tangible personal property to L.A. Young is an exempt
transaction as a sale to the State since RME negotiated with L.A.
-1-

Young for payment to be made by Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT") checks jointly payable to L.A. Young and RME.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's standard of review for both issues is Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)(1990). Pursuant to § 63-46b16(4)(d)(1990) this Court can grant relief if, on the basis of
the agency's record, it determines that RME has been
substantially prejudiced by an erroneous interpretation or
application of the law by the Tax Commission-

Thus the

"correction of error" standard is applicable to the issues
presented by this appeal.

Chris & Dicks Lumber and Hardware v.

Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991):
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the
amount paid or charged for the following:
(a) retail sales of tcingible personal property
made within the state;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(1987 & Supp. 1991):
(a) "Tangible personal property" means:
•

*

*

*

(iv) all other physically existing articles or
things, including property severed from real
estate.
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest therein or
improvements thereon;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2)(1987 & Supp. 1991):
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes
imposed by this chapter:
•

*

*

*

-2-

(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its
political subdivisions;
Utah Admin- Code R865-19-42S (1991):
1A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such
as counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water
districts are exempt from tax if such property [is] for
use in the exercise of an essential governmental
function. If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn
upon the state treasurer or the official disbursing
agent of any political subdivision, the sale is
considered as being made to the state of Utah or its
political subdivisions and exempt from tax.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an appeal from the Tax Commission's
Order issued from its Formal Hearing on February 13, 1991. At
issue before the Tax Commission was whether RME was required to
remit sales tax on its sale of slag material to L.A. Young.
RME's contention before the Tax Commission was that
this transaction involved the conveyance of an interest in land,
and was thus exempt from sales tax.

The Tax Commission

disagreed, and held that "[t]here was no evidence presented by
the Petitioner which would substantiate the Petitioner's claim
that the parties to the contract intended the purchase agreement
to constitute the sale of an interest in real property rather
than the sale of the slag material as tangible personal
property."

(R. 23.)

(Addendum A attached).

RME's second argument before the Tax Commission was
that these transactions should be exempt because it received
-3-

payment by way of a two-party check issued by UDOT to L.A. Young
and RME as co-payees.

The Tax Commission rejected this argument

and held that the manner of payment required by RME did not
change the transaction to one wherein RME sold the slag material
to the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts were stipulated or established by
testimony at the hearing before the Tax Commission.
1.

RME leased from Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott")

the slag pile.
2.

(R. 69.)

L.A. Young, in bidding on a UDOT highway project,

contacted RME for price quotes on the sale of slag material.

(R.

69.)
3.

RME offered L.A. Young two options in which to

purchase the slag.

Either RME would remove the material from the

slag pile for L.A. Young at a fixed price, or L.A. Young could
use its own equipment and remove* the slag material itself in
which case L.A. Young would pay RME $ .60 per ton.
4.

(R. 69-70.)

L.A. Young was the successful bidder on the UDOT

project, and elected to remove the material itself from RME's
slag pile.
5.

(R. 69.)
L.A. Young obtained from Kennecott a written

easement which granted L.A. Young access across Kennecott's
property to RME's slag pile.
6.

(R. 103-107.)

RME and L.A. Young had an oral agreement which gave
-.4-

L.A. Young permission to remove slag from RME's leasehold estate.
None of RME's agreement with L.A. Young was put in writing.

(R.

39, 47.)
7.

During the negotiations between RME and L.A. Young,

RME insisted that L.A. Young make arrangements with UDOT so that
RME would receive payment for the material from UDOT rather than
L.A. Young.
8.
parties.

(R. 70.)
This manner of payment was accepted by all three

Throughout the project UDOT issued checks payable to

both L.A. Young and RME.

UDOT would give these checks to its

contractor, L.A. Young, who would in turn endorse the checks and
give the checks to RME in payment for the slag material removed
by L.A. Young.

(R. 70.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Tax Commission correctly held that RME's sale of
slag material to L.A. Young involved the sale of tangible
personal property and as such was properly assessed a sales tax
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991).
The sale transactions did not involve a transfer of a
nontaxable interest in land as RME contends.

There was no

written agreement between the parties to transfer an interest in
real property.

The proper characterization of this transaction

is a license granted to L.A. Young to remove the slag material.
"A license is an authority or permission to do a particular act
or series of acts upon the land of another without possessing any
-5-

interest or estate in such land."

Tanner Companies, v. Arizona

State Land Dep't., 688 P.2d 1075, 1085 (Ariz. App. 1984).
Further, the sale of slag material was a sale of
tangible personal property by the mere fact that the slag
material which L.A. Young had permission to remove was material
which had previously been severed from realty through the mining
processes.

This slag material was, therefore, tangible personal

property even before L.A. Young loaded the material onto its
trucks.

Thus to characterize this transaction as RME selling

L.A. Young an interest in land is incorrect.
RME's sale of material to L.A. Young is not exempt from
taxation merely because UDOT paid for the material by means of
two-party checks payable to L.A. Young and RME.

The substance of

the transaction over the form must be considered here.

RME

insisted upon payment in this manner because of L.A. Young's
precarious financial position.

RME negotiated only with L.A.

Young and had no dealings with UDOT.

The sole fact that RME

received payment by means of a state warrant under these
circumstances does not alter the fact that this was a sales
transaction between RME and L.A. Young only.

-6-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SALE OF SLAG MATERIAL FROM
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY TO L.A. YOUNG
DID NOT INVOLVE A CONVEYANCE OF AN
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY

RME's contention that the transactions between itself
and L.A. Young involved a transfer of an interest in real
property is without merit.

RME claims its sale of slag material

is a nontaxable transaction since Utah's sales tax is applied
only on transactions of tangible personal property.

RME relies

upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(b)(1987 & Supp. 1991) which
states, "Tangible personal property' does not include:

(i) real

estate or any interest therein or improvements thereon; . . . ."
RME contends that a label on the transferred interest
is not important in finding the transaction between RME and L.A.
Young as nontaxable.

While a conveyance of an interest in land

is not a taxable event, it is necessary, when an alleged interest
is at issue, to see if there was a conveyance, and if so what
type of interest was transferred.

Therefore, to properly analyze

these transactions under § 59-12-102(13)(b)(1987 & Supp. 1991) it
is necessary to label the interest, if any, RME conveyed to L.A.
Young.

For instance, if RME had deeded property to L.A. Young,

or granted L.A. Young a lease, easement, or a profit a prendre,
there would have been a transfer of an interest in land, and thus
no sales tax assessed against RME.

However, the record does not

reflect facts which support a transfer of these types of
-7-

interests in land.
The Tax Commission was correct in labeling the
permission RME gave to L.A. Young as a license. A distinction
between a license and an interest in land was made in Radke v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 334 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959),
While under a lease an interest or estate in the land
itself is created, under a license a licensee has no
interest or estate in the land itself, but only in the
proceeds, . . . not as realty, but as personal
property/ . . . .
In general, a contract simply giving
a right to take ore from a mine, no interest or estate
being granted, confers a mere license . . .
Id. at 1086 (citing Saxman v. Christmann, 79 P.2d 520, 521 (Ariz.
1938), (emphasis added).
This language from Radke is highly relevant to the case
at bar.

In the present case, L.A. Young only had RME's

permission to load slag onto its own trucks;

in return L.A.

Young was required to pay RME $.60 per ton.

RME did not grant

any specific interest in land to L.A. Young.

RME was unable to

produce any written documentation to support its claim that an
interest in land was granted.

Rather RME and L.A. Young had only

an oral agreement which allowed the latter to remove slag from
RME's stockpile.1
The theory behind the Tax Commission's holding is

1

Counsel for RME admitted that there was no written
agreement between the parties by stating, "there is nc formal
written agreement, to the best of my knowledge, between R.M.E.
and L.A. Young. It was more or less just an understanding." (P.
39.) (See also R. 47.)

-8-

supported by this Court's decision in Wasatch Mines Co. v.
Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970).

In Wasatch, the

defendant's counterclaim asserted that he had received from the
plaintiff a "right to the soil on the land, a profit a prendre, .
, . ." Id. at 1010. The Court had before it a variety of
documents relating to the parties' business agreements which
involved the disputed interest in property at issue.

Nonetheless

the Wasatch Court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's
counterclaim "since the documents d[id] not identify the grantor,
the grantee, the interest granted, or a description of the
boundaries in a manner sufficient to construe the instruments as
a conveyance of an interest in land."

Id.

The transaction between RME and L.A. Young does not
meet the standard set forth by this Court in Wasatch.

There is

no document for the Court to properly apply the Wasatch test.
Again it bears mentioning that RME had no written agreement, yet
it claims that an interest in land was transferred.

With no

written agreement, this Court cannot ascertain the kind of
interest granted nor the boundaries of the alleged interest.
Thus the Tax Commission, basing its decision on the totality of
the circumstances, found that the sale of slag material was a
purchase of tangible personal property and did not involved a
nontaxable transfer of an interest in land.
RME's argument also fails under the recent standard set
forth in Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah
-9-

App. 1990)/ for determining whether a conveyance of mineral
interest exists in an agreement.

In Heiner the court stated,

"general principles governing the interpretation of contracts
apply to documents conveying mineral interests.

The cardinal

rule is to give effect to the intentions of the parties . . . .M
Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
Under the Heiner standard, the fact that there was no
written agreement between RME and L.A. Young supports the
conclusion that a license was granted to L.A. Young rather than
an interest in real property.

"It is presumed that a parol

agreement to impress property with a servitude is made with
knowledge of the Statute of Frauds and is therefore a license not
an easement*"

Thompson on Real Property § 223, at 224 (1980

Replacement), see also Mueller v. Keller, 164 N.E.2d 28 (111.
1960).
A mere oral understanding between RME and L.A. Young
which permitted L.A. Young to remove slag does not rise to the
level of an interest in land under the tests established by the
Wasatch and Heiner courts.

Thus the presumption of a license,

under the facts of the present case, is appropriate and is
supported by the facts.
The record further supports the Tax Commission's
decision that the transactions involved the sale of tangible
personal property rather than a transfer of an interest in land.
The question posed to RME at the Formal Hearing was whether its
-10-

slag pile was personalty or realty given that the slag material,
a waste product, had been previously severed from real property
during the mining process.

Counsel for RME responded, "I don't

think that there's any question that once the rock is severed
it's personal property.

I'm not going to sit here and tell you

that it's real property at that point."

(R. 47.)

By RME's own admission, its argument is flawed.

L.A.

Young obtained an easement from Kennecott, (R. 103), which
allowed L.A. Young access to the slag pile.

RME claims that it

granted an interest in real property to L.A. Young.

However,

L.A. Young only had oral permission to remove tangible personal
property from RME's leasehold estate.

This removal and sale of

slag material does not amount to an interest in real property.
L.A. Young had permission, properly labeled a license, from RME
to remove slag material itself.2
II.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY'S REQUIREMENT THAT L.A.
YOUNG PAY FOR THE MATERIAL BY A TWO-PARTY
CHECK ISSUED FROM UDOT DOES NOT EXEMPT THE
UNDERLYING TRANSACTION BETWEEN ROCKY MOUNTAIN
ENERGY AND L.A. YOUNG FROM TAXATION
The payment procedure in this case required issuance of

2

Tanner Cos. v. Ariz. State Land Dept., 688 P.2d 1075
(Ariz. App. 1984) required the court to interpret what interest
was transferred when the lessee under a government lease entered
into an oral agreement with a third party which authorized the
latter to remove clay from lessee's leasehold for 25 cents per
ton. The court held, "[t]he agreement between the parties here
was nothing more than a license. A license is an authority or
permission to do a particular act or series of acts upon the land
of another without possessing any interest or estate in such
land." Id. at 1085.
-11-

a two-party check payable to L.A. Young and RME as co-payees.
"The warrants were received by L.A, Young from UDOT.

The

warrants were endorsed by L.A. Young and handed over to RME,
which was entitled to the full check."
70.)

(Stipulation of Facts, R.

The record of this case establishes that the method of

payment was negotiated between RME and L.A. Young.

Ici. RME

insisted "that L.A. Young make arrangements with UDOT to make
payment for the slag material by means of naming RME as a payee
on UDOT's checks" along with L.A. Young. JEd. This manner of
payment was arranged by RME because of its concern of L.A.
Young's potential for nonpayment.
The procedure of payment in the present case does not
alter the underlying contracts to change a taxable sale of
tangible personal property between RME and L.A. Young to a
nontaxable sale of material between RME and the State of Utah.
In this instance, it is necessary to look at the underlying
substance of the agreements between RME, L.A. Young, and UDOT
rather than the outwardly appearing form of payment.

As the

Hawaii Supreme court stated, "it is well settled that in
determining tax liability, the substance of a transaction rather
than its form governs."

Matter of O.W. Ltd. Partnership, 668

P.2d 56, 63 (Haw. 1983).
The substance of the underlying agreement is that RME
did not negotiate with UDOT.

Thus, RME was not a party to the

contract between L.A. Young and UDOT.
-12-

Further, the record is

devoid of any invoices or other documentation of sale between RME
and UDOT.

From this it follows that RME did not sell slag

material to UDOT.
RME claims that the transactions involved a sale of
personal property to the State.

This claim is based on the sole

fact that UDOT paid L.A. Young with a two-party check with RME
designated as a co-payee.

This claim is too narrow in focus,

does not consider the totality of the circumstances and reaches
an erroneous conclusion.
The Tax Commission correctly saw the underlying
substantive agreements as follows:

first, a contract between RME

and L.A. Young for slag material; and second, a contract between
L.A. Young and UDOT for services and material.

Furthermore, the

Tax Commission looked beyond the formalities and the reasons
payment was structured in the manner it was, and considered the
substance of the transaction.

Its determination that the

transaction between RME and L.A. Young is not an exempt sale
simply because payment was made by a UDOT check should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission was correct in classifying the
agreement between RME and L.A. Young as a license which gave L.A.
Young the right to remove tangible personal property from RME's
leasehold estate.

Thus the Tax Commission was correct in

upholding the assessment of sales tax on these sale transactions.
Furthermore, the underlying arrangement between RME and
-13-

L.A. Young establishes that these transactions were taxable
notwithstanding that RME received payment for the material by
checks from UDOT made jointly payable to RME and L.A. Young.
The Tax Commission respectfully requests that its
decision be affirmed.

/ 7£

DATED this
.8 ^>
V>

day of December, 1991

/^A'/i n

By.
BRIAN L. TARBET
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Utah State
Tax Commission
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY CO.,
Petitioner,
ORDER
v.
Appeal No. 87-2039

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for

oral

arguments

Petitioner's

Motion

on November

19, 1990, pursuant

for Summary Judgment.

to

the

Paul F. Iwasaki,

Presiding Officer, and Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner, heard the
matter

for

and

on behalf

of

the

Commission.

representing the Petitioner was James D. Douglass.
representing

the Respondent

was

Brian L.

Present

and

Present and

Tarbet, Assistant

Attorney General.
Based upon the memoranda submitted, and oral arguments
of the parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales tax.

2.

The audit period in question is from January 1,

1984, through December 31, 1986.
3.
Corporation.

The Petitioner is a subsidiary of Union Pacific

Appeal No. 87-20.
4.

The Petitioner is engaged in the processing and

selling of slag material it extracts from a slag pile which is
leased from Kennecott Copper Corporation in Magna, Utah.
5.

The Petitioner removes the slag by the use of a

front-end loader, and loads the slag into trucks.

The slag is

transported to its facilities where the slag is crushed.

The

crushed slag is typically used for railroad ballast and fill
material used in highway construction.
6.
which

The slag pile is approximately 175 acres in size,

rises

to

approximately

100

feet

higher

than

the

surrounding terrain.
7.

During the audit period, the Petitioner entered

into an agreement with L.A. Young and Sons Construction Company
to provide L.A, Young with slag to be used in the construction
of a highway project that L.A. Young had agreed to perform for
the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT).
the construction
doze, and

company, the

Petitioner

At the choice of

would:

(1)

load the material at a fixed price or; (2)

rip,
the

construction company could rip, doze, and load the material and
pay the Petitioner 60 cents per ton.

It was this second option

that L.A. Young chose.
8.

Based upon the choice of the second option by

L.A. Young, L.A. Young was permitted to remove the material
from a designated site within the slag pile area.
9.

As the highway fill material was installed, UDOT

paid for that fill material.

Payment was made by warrants

drawn on UDOT' s account and, at the request of the Petitioner,
said warrants were mace pavable to the Petitioner

and 1 A

Appeal No. 87-20.
Young as co-payees.

This procedure was done at the request of

the Petitioner to ensure payment by L.A. Young.
10.
by L.A.

As payments for the fill material were received

Young, L.A.

Young

endorsed

the

warrants

and

then

submitted them to Petitioner as payment for the fill material
purchased.
11.
October

An informal hearing was held on this matter on

5, 1988.

Commission,

An

dated

informal decision was rendered by the

February

21,

assessment of the Respondent
Petitioner.

Thereafter,

1989,

which

affirmed

and denied the request

the

Petitioner

filed

the

of the

its

appeal

requesting a formal hearing in this matter.
12.

Prior

to

formal

hearing

in

this

matter,

the

Petitioner requested that the matter be disposed of by way of
its Motion for Summary Judgment, which formed the basis for
this order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property
made within the state.

"Tangible personal property" does not

include real estate or any interest therein or improvements
thereon.

(Utah Code Ann. §§59-12-103 and §59-12-102.)
Sales made to the state of Utah are exempt from tax if

such property was purchased

for use in the exercise

essential governmental function.
warrant

drawn

disbursing

upon

agency

of

the

state

of

an

If the sale is paid for by
Treasurer

any political

or

the

subdivision,

a

official
sale

is

considered as beina made to the state of Utah or its political
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subdivisions and exempt from tax.

(Utah State Tax Commission

Administrative Rule R865-19-42S.)
DECISION AND ORDER
In the present case, the Petitioner argues that the
purchases of the slag material by L.A. Young were exempt from
sales tax for one of two alternative reasons: (1)

Petitioner

sold L.A. Young an interest in real property rather than a sale
of tangible personal property, and thus was exempt from sales
tax; or (2)

the sale of the slag material was a sale to the

state of Utah, and thus exempt from taxation.
Turning to the Petitioner's first argument, the Tax
Commission finds that the sale of the slag material to L.A.
Young was a sale of tangible personal property and not the sale
of an interest in land.

There was no evidence presented by the

Petitioner which would substantiate the Petitioner's claim that
the parties to the contract intended the purchase agreement to
constitute the sale of an interest in real property rather than
the sale of the slag material as tangible personal property.
Indeed, even the purchasing option offered
Young

by

the

Petitioner

would

indicate

that

to

neither

L.A.
party

intended this to be anything more than giving L.A. Young a
license to enter onto the property to remove and extract the
slag material.

The

Petitioner

agrees

that

had

L.A.

Young

chosen the first option, that is to have the Petitioner rip,
doze,

or

functions

load

the

itself,

material
the

sale

tangible personal property.
does

not

magically

rather
would

than

performing

constitute

the

those

sale

of

Merely choosing the second option

transform

what

is otherwise

a sale of
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tangible personal property

into the sale of a real property

right, nor does it change the character or nature of the slag
removed.
It should be noted that the Petitioner was not able to
provide the Commission with a copy of any agreement between the
Petitioner and L.A. Young which would in any way indicate that
the

transference

of

some

real

property

right

had

indeed

occurred.
Turning next to the Petitioner's alternative argument,
that the sale of the slag material was a sale to the state of
Utah or one of its departments and thus exempt from taxation,
the Tax Commission finds that this argument too

is without

merit.
As correctly pointed out by

the Respondent

in its

brief and its oral argument, the mere fact that the Petitioner
was named as a co-payee on the warrants issued by UDOT does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the sale of the slag
material was a sale to the state of Utah or that a contractual
relationship existed between the Petitioner and the state of
Utah.
As the Respondent points out, there were in fact two
separate transactions conducted which must be viewed separately:
1.

The

agreement

between

the

Petitioner

and

L.A.

Young; and
2.

The agreement between L.A. Young and the state of

The

first

Utah.
transaction

was

a

transfer

of

tangible

personal property from the Petitioner to L.A. Ycur.g, which was
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subject

to

sales

tax.

The

second

transaction

was

the

performance of services by L.A. Young for the state of Utah,
with payment made by the state of Utah to L.A. Young.

The fact

that the Petitioner was named as a co-payee on the warrant as a
measure of protection for the Petitioner does not establish a
contractual relationship between the Petitioner and the state
of Utah whereby the Petitioner was selling its product directly
to the state.
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax

Commission

finds

that the sale of the slag material to L.A. Young constituted
the sale of tangible personal property to a party other than
the state of Utah, or any of its departments, or any of its
political subdivisions, and therefore, was a sale subject to
sales tax.

Therefore, the Tax Commission

affirms its prior

decision which affirmed the assessment of the Respondent and
denies the motion of the Petitioner.
favor of the Respondent.
DATED thi
Lis

\*5

Judgment is entered in

It is so ordered,
day of J^\ Anxxo^X.

, 1991.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

R. H. Hansen
Chairman

[&£ B. Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63~4 6b-l^*^-^ >
63-46b-14(2)(a).
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